Partisan identity, gender, and American political beliefs on gender equality

Americans’ attitudes and beliefs about gender equality are tied to their partisan identities and gender. These are both, in turn, influenced by several ingredients of public opinion, including socialization, various theories of morality, and personality traits.

We should care about gender equality because it is economically and socially beneficial to society. Every day we miss this key equality marker represents a loss of financial growth and the chance of a better quality of life. Of course, a perfect state of parity is impossible due to natural variances in people’s lives and different interpretations of the terminology. There would also be necessary adaptations such as increased unpaid work at home for men. But in the end, the overall benefits to society are too great to ignore.

Gender equality benefits society

A growing body of scientific literature supports the concept that gender equality benefits society. This is partially due to strong stimuli in 2015 and prior from the UN’s Development Programme encouraging the world’s 187 countries to commit to — and meet — seventeen sustainable development goals by 2030. Goal Five, “Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls,” is a driving force for research.[1]

The economic benefits of gender equality are significant. Authors of a 2015 financial analysis from McKinsey Global Institute found that, “If women were to participate in the economy identically to men, they could add as much as $28 trillion or 26 percent to annual global GDP in 2025.” [2],[3] The US would see up to $5 trillion of that benefit due to the relative size of its economy. A 2017 econometric modeling study by Morais Maceira measured how gender equality could impact economic growth in the European Union (EU). The author concluded that, “. . . improved gender equality would have a largely positive effect on GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita and on employment of women,” and credited this positive impact on, “. . . an increase in productivity and an improvement to the potential productive capacity of the economy.” [4]

Other studies have found measurable social benefits from gender equality. In 2018, Audette et al conducted a cross-national analysis on the effect of gender equality on life satisfaction, concluding that, “Promoting gender equality is one important way of fostering happiness and well-being in a country.” [5] And these benefits were not exclusive to women in the study. Audette reported that findings, “. . .applied to men and women alike.” [6]

There are also unintended benefits to gender equality that can be surprising. For example, a study by Hudson et al correlated gender equality to peace, finding a true “peace dividend.” According to the authors, “Gender equality is a more reliable predictor of peace than a country’s gross domestic product or level of democracy.” [23],[24]

I was unable to find credible sources in the literature defending negative societal impacts of gender parity. But there are some strong feelings about the question, shown, for example, on an on-line gender equality debate forum. After reviewing comments from this unmoderated web site, two anti-equality themes from respondents emerged: (1) traditional gender roles offer “protection” to women that would be lost, and (2) work outside of the home is seen as an undue burden for women.[25]

American public opinion on gender equality

Poll after poll shows that Americans have strong opinions about gender equality, and there are measurable differences by party identification and gender. A Pew Research Center poll from March 2020 showed that less than half of the men felt the country “has not gone far enough on gender equality,” while almost two-thirds of the women felt this way. The party differences were even starker: Only one-third of Republicans agreed with the statement — and seventeen percent of them felt gender equality had gone too far. In contrast, seventy six percent of the Democrats agreed with it. [26] The same Pew poll showed that most Americans recognize a need for gender equality, but, again, there were clear differences by party and gender. US women were more likely than men to agree there is “work to do to give women equal rights with men,” and Democrats were far more likely to agree about this than Republicans. A 2017 Pew poll showed a similar gender-based trend: six in ten women said the country has not gone far enough when it comes to gender equality.[27] A June 2020 Gallup poll report found that most Republicans believe women have already achieved gender equality in the workplace and in politics, while a majority of Democrats did not. The authors concluded that, “Partisanship is a stronger factor than gender when it comes to perceptions of women’s equality.”

Republican men, though, were more confident about it than Republican women: seventy-five percent of the men believed we had already attained gender equality as opposed to only fifty-six percent of the women. Democrats were more aligned. Ninety percent of the Democratic women and men agreed that we are not there yet.[28] A June 2020 CBS News poll and a 2014 CNN poll showed similar results.[29],[30]

American public opinion has evolved toward greater support for gender parity over five decades, but improvements in key indicators — like employment rates and investment in childcare — are slowing down. According to a 2018 analysis, England et al used validated indicators to show that measurable change has slowed in recent decades.[31] In 2020, an analysis from the World Bank Group’s Central Bank for Reconstruction and Development found that, “Only 6 of 187 countries give women equal legal work rights as men.” [32] Finally, according to the 2015 World Economic Forum Report, the economic gender gap has widened, and at the current slow rate of progress, “. . . it will not be closed for another 217 years.”[33]

Variables in political decision-making

So, when everyone receives positive benefits from gender equality, why are there such gaps in American political opinion about it? Many political opinion theories on socialization, morality, and personality can provide clues about this disconnect when viewed together and in various combinations.

Socialization: Everyone grows up in some type of social environment consisting of family members, friends, neighbors, schoolmates; living in rural, suburban, or urban settings; and within a wide array of religions and cultures. These environments can have long term impacts on political identities and opinions. In 1954, Bernard et al first published about what they called the “hereditary vote,” where seventy five percent of adults voted like their fathers.[34] Much later, in a series of four studies published by Geoffrey Cohen in 2003, party information measurably impacted the subjects’ reported policy positions. Democrats and Republicans — regardless of how much they already knew about the policies in question — shifted their views to match their party’s position once they were exposed to it. There is also an interesting twist: according to Cohen, “. . . participants denied having been influenced by their political groups, although they believed the other individuals, especially their ideological adversaries, would be so influenced.” [35] Socialization can therefore account for partisan differences and levels of support and enthusiasm for gender equality, but can also cloud judgement, providing another explanation for differences by party on gender equality.

Theories of morality: Are political opinions guided by rational thinking or gut-reactions — or maybe a little of both? Researchers conducted a series of studies trying to pin down the sources and processes of political decision-making that have evolved over time.

Rational vs social intuitionist models: Rationalists like Lawrence Kohlberg thought that people made political decisions by logically weighing information and then making post hoc judgments.[36] Richard Shweder showed that reason was combined with intuitive responses or gut-reactions.[37] Jonathan Haidt turned this concept on its head in 2001 with his social intuitionist model. He found that study subjects made immediate moral judgements first, followed by rationalizations to support those judgements.[38]

Motivated reasoning theory: In 2013, Dan Kahan built on Cohen’s earlier work on group influence by tying unconscious motivating factors to political judgement. According to Kahan, individuals, “. . . fit their processing of information to conclusions that suit some end or goal,” based on construct, personality, existential needs, and moral intuitions. [39]

Moral foundations theory: Moral foundations theory was developed by a group of US-based social and cultural psychologists to help explain the many similarities and differences in morality they had observed between global cultures.[40] In a 2009 meta-analysis, Haidt et al identified at least six moral foundations that are common among all cultures, defined broadly. They also observed that similarly minded “moral communities” find each other and build on these foundations in unique ways.[41] Some resistance to gender equality may come from personality types within these communities who tend to score higher on Haidt’s foundations of loyalty/betrayal and authority/subversion (See box 2 for definitions).

Moral foundations theory reinforces survey data that show Democrats being more likely to express empathy than Republicans, which could impact their respective positions on gender equality. Graham et al reported in 2009 that, “Across 4 studies using multiple methods, liberals consistently showed greater endorsement and use of the harm/care and fairness/reciprocity foundations compared to the other 3 foundations, whereas conservatives endorsed and used the 5 foundations more equally.” [42],[43]

Personality Traits: Personality differences can be tied to partisan decision making, another reason conservatives may be less supportive of gender equality than liberals. To test these traits, many researchers rely on the “Big 5 Personality Traits” battery of questions that measure openness to experience, conscientiousness, extroversion (introversion), agreeableness, and emotional stability (neuroticism).[44]

Authoritarianism: In 2003, Stanley Feldman published a new framework for “authoritarianism,” defined by him as a conservative belief in social norms that embrace enforced conformity to maintain a well-ordered society. His stated purpose was to offer “. . .a new conceptualization in which authoritarian predispositions originate in the conflict between the values of social conformity and personal autonomy.” Feldman developed a series of five statements that clustered the contrasting personality traits of social conformity on one end (associated with conservatives) and personal autonomy on the other (associated with liberals). These statements featured five contrasting personality traits: the social norms of “fitting in” vs. free expression, fear of disorder vs. supporting individual freedom, respect for unbending rules vs. openness to rules being changed, and consistent adherence to a cohesive set of values vs. openness to multiple viewpoints.[45] Karen Feldman, an Australian researcher, countered Feldman’s framework for its reliance on a single type of conservatism, and cited research that supports the concept of three different types of conservatism, authoritarianism being only one of them.[46]

Motivated social cognition theory: In a meta-analysis published in 2003, Jost et al presented the role of motivated social cognition — the influence of various motives on cognitive processes that take place during social interactions — in conservative political decision-making.[47] They were criticized for assuming that only conservatives possess authoritarian personalities. Greenberg and Jonas responded to Jost et al’s analysis and offered an alternative view, questioning the assumption that fear and uncertainty always drive conservative views, and stated that, “. . . the motives in the model are equally well served by rigid adherence to any extreme ideology regardless of whether it is right wing or left wing.”[48] We know from the examples of Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and other countries that the extreme left can also be authoritarian.

Conclusion

Our early social environments establish a foundation of belief systems that impact our political opinions for the rest of our lives, at various levels and intensities. Group identity is a touchstone for what to think, and our personalities often drive how we make political decisions. The opinions we express at the polls are not based on reason but on our emotional shorthand, only later modified by reasoning. That means we cannot change the minds of people we disagree with by presenting facts or just telling them they are wrong based on evidence. People are not rational beings who always use logic and self-interest to make political decisions for a complex and intermingled number of reasons. Just because gender equality policies have been shown to benefit everyone, does not mean everyone recognizes those benefits, or, if they do, that they are laudable. America’s challenge will be translating these concepts into gender equality policies that help make everyone’s lives better. This will take empathy and patience with people who have different opinions than our own.

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Addendum: A brief history of public opinion research theories and models

Political scientists have evolved in their thinking over the past eighty years about why and how people make political decisions and act on them. They have developed, tested, and expanded theories to help explain why people make political decisions and how those opinions might shift over time.

Early political scientists relied on the economic self-interest model to explain political behaviors, assuming logic always prevails, and people vote to maximize their personal benefits. Following Gallup’s launch of the first scientific polling group in 1935, political scientists had more data to inform their work, leading to a game-changing correlation in voting patterns identified a decade later in the so-called “Chicago Studies” in the late 1940s. Berelson et al found that 75% of people voted like their fathers, which they described as the “hereditary vote.”[7],[8] These data spurred new thinking about political decision-making: Children from partisan environments can be influenced by the social milieu of their family, friends, neighbors, churches, etc. Berelson et al also proposed a social differentiation model featuring primary groups whose members are likely to vote in similar ways. Kohlberg, a rationalist famous for his “Heinz’ Dilemma” research with children, proposed that moral reasoning in political decision-making is a learned behavior that comes first, followed by judgment.[9] As a 1960s outlier, Converse then upset the cart by proposing that political beliefs do not exist and that political decision-making is essentially a random act.[10] In 1973, Erickson and Tedin pointed to social class, race, age, religion, and zip code as good indicators of voting patterns.[11]

Over the past thirty years, a rash of political scientists have built on — and sometimes discarded — previous theories and developed new, more complex models to help explain the many dimensions of political behavior. In 1990, Sears and Funk deflated earlier self-interest theories, concluding that most people think about political issues, “. . .in a disinterested frame of mind.”[12] Zaller introduced a three-step “consideration” model in 1994: individuals receive information from trusted sources, accept it based on various considerations, and rely on whatever is top of mind at the decision point.[13] Jost dismissed Converse’s “chaos” theory and proposed that political ideas arise from psychological needs and motives.[14] Shweder and other social intuitionists introduced culturally sensitive, complex, and potentially more realistic models to explain the psychological processes behind political beliefs.[15] Haidt brought us the social intuitionist theory that reason comes second to passion — the opposite of Kohlberg’s rationalism — and argued that political opinions arise from gut instincts, often tempered afterward by reflection and evaluation. [16],[17] Haidt and his team conducted a meta-analysis that led to Moral Foundations Theory, six sets of moral principles that are shared across cultures.[18] In 2014, Feldman and Johnston proposed a two-dimensional approach to explain political opinions and ideologies.[19] More recently, Fukuyama added identity and demand for public recognition as drivers of political opinions.[20] Jost et al, brought us motivated social cognition theory in 2003, where thought processes are subject to various political motives.[21] Feldman explored a new authoritarianism framework as personality trait, and Kahan expanded on Cohen’s motivated reasoning, ultimately developing the Politically Motivated Reasoning Paradigm in 2015.[22]

Notes

[1] “Sustainable Development Goal Number Five (SDG5): Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls.” United Nations Development Programme (2015). London. Accessed on July 15, 2020, at https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/gender-equality

[2] J Woetzel, A Madgavkar, K Ellingrud, E Labaye, S Devillard, E Kutcher, J Manyika, R Dobbs, M Krishnan. “The power of parity: how advancing women’s equality can add $12 trillion to global growth.” McKinsey Global Institute, London (2015). Accessed on August 12, 2020, at https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/employment-and-growth/how-advancing-womens-equality-can-add-12-trillion-to-global-growth

[3] A Madgavkar, K Ellingrud, M Krishnan. “The economic benefits of gender parity.” Stanford Social Innovation Review (March 8, 2016). Accessed on August 16, 2020, at https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_economic_benefits_of_gender_parity#

[4] H M Maceira. “The economic benefits of gender equality in the EU.” Intereconomics, 52(3), (2017) 178–183. Accessed on August 16, 2020, at https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2017/number/3/article/economic-benefits-of-gender-equality-in-the-eu.html

[5] A Audette, S Lam, H O’Connor, B Radcliff. “(E)Quality of Life: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effect of Gender Equality on Life Satisfaction.” Journal of Happiness Studies (2018). 20.10.1007. Accessed on July 15, 2020, at https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10902-018-0042-8

[6] A Audette. “Gender equality improves life satisfaction for men and women.” London School of Economics and Political Science Business Review (August 24, 2019). Accessed on July 15, 2020, at https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2019/08/24/gender-equality-improves-life-satisfaction-for-men-and-women

[7] “American Institute of Public Opinion was formed in 1935.” Gallup. Web page accessed on July 12, 2020, at https://www.gallup.com/education/227672/about.aspx

[8] B Berelson, P Lazarsfeld, W McPhee. “Voting: a study of opinion formation in a presidential campaign, social process.” University of Chicago Press, Chicago (1954) 88–90.

[9] L Kohlberg. “Essays on moral development, vol l: the philosophy of moral development.” Harper & Row, San Francisco (1981).

[10] P Converse. “The nature of belief systems in mass publics.” In Apter, D (ed.) Ideology and Discontent, The Free Press, New York (1964)

[11] R Erickson, K Tedin. “American public opinion: its origins, content, and impact (7th Edition).” Pearson Longman, London (July 13, 2004)

[12] D Sears, C Funk. “The limited effect of economic self-interest on the political attitudes of the mass public.” Journal of Behavioral Economics. 19(3) (Fall 1990) 247–271.

[13] J Zaller, J. “The nature and origins of mass opinion.” The Journal of Politics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 56(2), (May 1994) 528–531.

[14] J Jost. “The End of End of Ideology.” American Psychologist, v61(7) (October 2006) 651–670.

[15] R Shweder. “Thinking through cultures: expeditions in cultural psychology.” Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA (1991)

[16] Jonathan Haidt. “The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgement.” Psychological Review 108(4) (2001) 814–834.

[17] J Haidt. “The righteous mind: why good people are divided by politics and religion.” Vintage Books, New York (2012)

[18] J Haidt, P Ditto, J Graham, R Iyer, S Koleva, M Motyl, G Sherman, S Wojcik. “Moral foundation theory.” Web site accessed on August 17, 2020, at https://moralfoundations.org

[19] S Feldman, C Johnston. “Understanding the determinants of political ideology: implications of structural complexity.” Political Psychology, v35(3) (June 2014) 337–358.

[20] Francis Fukuyama. “Identity: the demand for dignity and the politics of resentment.” Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, New York (2018)

[21] JT Jost, J Glaser, AW Kruglanski, F Sulloway. “Political conservatism as motivated social cognition.” Psychological Bulletin, 129(3) (2003) 339–375. Accessed on July 23, 2020, at https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2003-00782-003

[22] DM Kahan. “The politically motivated reasoning paradigm.” Emerging Trends in Social & Behavioral Sciences (December 14, 2015, last revised March 12, 2016). Accessed on August 15, 2020, at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2703011

[23] VM Hudson, B Ballif-Spanvill, M Caprioli, CF Emmett. “Sex and world peace.” Feminism and Psychology, 24(3) (August 1, 2014) 408–409. Accessed on August 12, 2020, at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0959353513515771

[24] “Does gender equality lead to peace?” Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, (2014). Fact sheet accessed on August 12, 2020, at https://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/Fact%20Sheet%20Gender%20Equality.pdf

[25] “Is gender equality actually hurting women?” Debate.org. Website accessed on August 16, 2020, at https://www.debate.org/opinions/is-gender-equality-actually-hurting-women

[26] J Menasce, R Igielnik. “Wide Partisan Gaps in U.S. Over How Far the Country Has Come on Gender Equality.” Pew Research Center (March 2020), Accessed on July 7, 2020, at https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/10/18/wide-partisan-gaps-in-u-s-over-how-far-the-country-has-come-on-gender-equality

[27] J Menasce, Horowitz, K Parker, R Stepler. “Wide Partisan Gaps in U.S. Over How Far the Country Has Come on Gender Equality.” Pew Research Center (October 18, 2017). Accessed on August 15, 2020, at https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/10/18/wide-partisan-gaps-in-u-s-over-how-far-the-country-has-come-on-gender-equality

[28] Gallup Organization, Gallup Poll, Gallup Organization, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 2020), Dataset. Accessed on August 16, 2020, at https://ropercenter-cornell-edu.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/ipoll

[29] CBS News, CBS News Poll, Question 34, 31117438.00033, SSRS, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 2020), Dataset. Accessed on August 15, 2020, at Roper iPoll

[30] Cable News Network (CNN), CNN/ORC Poll: Immigration/Abortion/Snowden/Winter Olympics/Politics, Opinion Research Corporation, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 2014), Dataset. Accessed on August 15, 2020, at Roper iPoll

[31] P England, A Levine, E Mishel. “Progress toward gender equality in the United States has slowed or stalled.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (March 31, 2020) v(13) 6990–699. Accessed on August 16, 2020, at https://www.pnas.org/content/117/13/6990

[32] “Women, business, and the law 2020.” World Bank Group, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2020). Washington, DC. Accessed on August 17, 2020, at https://wbl.worldbank.org/#

[33] K Schwab, R Samans, S Zahid, A Leopold, V Ratcheva, R Hausmann, L D’Andrea. “The Global Gender Gap Report.” World Economic Forum, Geneva (November 2, 2017). Accessed on August 12, 2020, at https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-gender-gap-report-2017

[34] BR Berelson, PF Lazarsfeld, WN McPhee. “Voting: a study of opinion formation in a presidential campaign” (Chapter 6). University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

[35] GL Cohen. “Party over policy: the dominating impact of group influence on political beliefs.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85(5) (2003) 808–822.

[36] L Kohlberg. “Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education” in C. M. Beck, B. S. Crittenden, E. V. Sullivan (eds), Moral Education: Interdisciplinary Approaches, University of Toronto Press, Toronto (1971) 23–92.

[37] R Shweder. “Thinking through cultures: expeditions in cultural psychology.” Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA (1991).

[38] J Haidt. “The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgement.” Psychological Review 108(4) (2001) 814–834.

[39] DM Kahan. “Ideology, motivated reasoning, and cognitive reflection.” Judgement and Decision Making 8(4) (July 2013) 407–424.

[40] J Haidt, P Ditto, J Graham, R Iyer, S Koleva, M Motyl, G Sherman, S Wojcik. Moral foundation theory. Web site accessed on August 17, 2020, at https://moralfoundations.org

[41] J Haidt, J Graham, C Joseph. “Above and Below Left-Right: Ideological Narratives and Moral Foundations.” Psychological Inquiry 20 (2009) 110–119. Accessed on July 5, 2020, at https://www-jstor-org.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/stable/40646408?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

[42] J Haidt. “The righteous mind: why good people are divided by politics and religion.” Vintage Books, New York (2012)

[43] J Graham, J Haidt, BA Nosek. “Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Different Sets of Moral Foundations.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(5), (2009) 1029–1046. Accessed on July 12, 2020, at https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015141

[44] LR Goldberg. “An alternative description of personality: The Big-Five Factor Structure.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 59(6) (1990) 1216–1229. Accessed on August 12, 2020, at https://cmapspublic2.ihmc.us/rid=1LQBQ96VY-19DH2XW-GW/Goldberg.Big-Five-FactorsStructure.JPSP.1990.pdf

[45] S Feldman. “Enforcing Social Conformity: A Theory of Authoritarianism.” Political Psychology 24(1) (2003): 41–74. Accessed June 29, 2020, at www.jstor.org/stable/3792510

[46] K Stenner. “Three kinds of ‘conservatism.’” Psychological Inquiry 20 (2009) 142–159.

[47] JT Jost, J Glaser, AW Kruglanski, F Sulloway. “Political conservatism as motivated social cognition.” Psychological Bulletin, 129(3) (2003) 339–375. Accessed on July 23, 2020, at https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2003-00782-003

[48] J Greenberg, E Jonas. “Motives and Political Orientation — The Left, The Right, and the Rigid: Comment on Jost et al 2003.” Psychological Bulletin. 19 (3) (2003) 376–382. Accessed on July 18, 2020, at http://dx.doi.org.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.376